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In the late 1990s and early 2000s, China’s Ministry of Education embarked on an ambitious 
program of elementary school mergers by shutting down small village schools and opening up 
larger centralized schools in towns and county seats. The goal of the program was to improve the 
teacher and building resources in an attempt to raise the human capital of students in poor rural 
areas, although it was recognized that students would lose the opportunity to learn in the settings of 
their own familiar villages. Because of the increased distances to the new centralized schools, the 
merger program also entailed building boarding facilities and encouraging or mandating that 
students live at school during the week away from their family. Given the magnitude of the program 
and the obvious mix of benefits and costs that such a program entails there has been surprisingly 
little effort to evaluate the impact of creating a new system that transfers students from school to 
school during their elementary school period of education and, in some cases, making student live in 
boarding facilities at school. In this paper, our overall goal is to examine the impact of the Rural 
Primary School Merger Program on academic performance of students using a dataset from a 
survey that we designed to reflect transfer paths and boarding statuses of students. We use OLS and 
Propensity Score Matching approaches and demonstrate that there is a large ―resource effect‖ (that 
is, an effect that appears to be associated with the better facilities and higher quality of teachers in 
the town and county schools) that appears to be associated with the transfers of students from less 
centralized schools (such as, village schools) to more centralized schools. Boarding, however, is 
shown to have negative impacts on academic performance. However, students who transfer to 
county school benefit from the transfer no matter where they start and whether they board or not. 
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Transfer Paths and Academic Performance:   
The Primary School Merger Program in China 
 
1. Introduction 
In 2001 as part of its effort to improve the overall level of primary education and 
address the educational disparities between urban and rural areas, China’s State Council 
announced the Rural Primary School Merger Program (Ministry of Education, 2001). The 
Program essentially involves shutting down remote village schools and ―teaching points‖ 
(jiaoxuedian)—one-room type school houses located in villages that offer schooling to 
students in grades 1 through 3 or 4—and merging them into centralized town or county 
schools. Implementation of the Merger Program accelerated in the early and mid-2000s. 
For example, 31,700 primary schools were closed down and merged in 2004 (MOE, 
2005). The number of primary schools in rural China fell by nearly 24 percent between 
2001 and 2005 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2006).   
The Merger Program has created a lot of debate in the literature about whether the 
policy is benefiting children in poor rural areas. In theory, students are supposed to benefit 
from improved educational quality by having access to larger, more centrally located 
educational facilities which can be built in such a way as to take advantage of scale 
economies. Better teachers can be hired. Facilities can be built to higher quality standards 
and equipped better. In larger schools, teachers are able to focus on students in a single 
grade and, in many cases, on a single course. In contrast, teaching points, which are 
remotely located schools sometimes accommodating fewer than 10 students, typically 2 
 
have only one teacher per school, who is responsible for teaching several different grades 
and acting as the managing staff for the whole school. The curriculum is often restricted 
to math and Chinese language—with little supplementary teaching of science, art, music 
or other types of courses. Central schools are supposed to offer a richer curriculum, 
including science, English, art, music and other subjects. In the rest of the paper, when 
schools have better facilities and higher quality teaching staff, we will call this the 
resource effect.   
While there may be many potential benefits to the Merger Program, there also are 
potential costs. Pang (2006) describes a number of the detrimental effects. Because the 
new centralized schools are often located far from the homes of students, children must be 
boarded at school. In some cases this means that six and seven year olds have to leave the 
comfort and familiarity of their homes and care of their parents to live in dormitories far 
away from their friends and family. Safety is certainly a concern. The new living 
environment may take a toll on the psychological and physical health of students and thus 
affect learning (Luo et al., 2009). 
Another set of potential costs of the Merger Program stems from student transfers 
out of schools that are being shut down and into the new centralized schools. Similar costs 
are incurred even when students are not caught up in mergers but when parents transfer 
their children from one school (say a school in the village or town) to another school (for 
example, a school in the county seat). We term the ways in which students have been 
shuffled around the school system (or the different channels by which students move from 3 
 
grade 1 to grade 6) transfer paths. Possible transfer paths depend on the local 
government’s implementation of the Merger Program and on decisions made by the 
parents themselves. For instance, Shanxi Province piloted its Merger Program in 2001. 
The program was expanded in 2004. By the end of 2004, 829 primary schools had been 
shut down. These efforts were part of their plan to remove all teaching points and cut 
village schools from 2224 in 2007 to 800 in 2010 (MOE, Lü liang County). Students who 
attended the teaching points or village schools that closed were transferred to a town, 
county or other village school. Liu et al. (2010) show that each provincial and county 
government has taken a different approach to setting up the Merger plan. These have 
included: merging all sub-village teaching points into one school for each (one or two) 
village(s) if the village has a population above a certain threshold (Henan Province); 
shutting down teaching points that have only one teacher and merging them into 
surrounding village schools (Yunnan Province); establishing large, centralized town and 
county boarding schools to receive students from nearby villages and teaching points 
(Qinghai Province); and many others. In our interviews in China’s poor northwest region, 
we often find that all of these different transfer paths can exist in a single county. As a 
result, specific transfer paths differ by student even within the same county. Since each 
transfer path has its own unique set of benefits (resource effects vary across schools) and 
costs (abrupt changes in environment, embodied in different transfer paths, can affect 
students differently depending on age, etc.), it is possible that different transfer paths will 
have different impacts on the educational performance of students.     4 
 
Empirically, the success of the Merger Program has been mixed. There is no doubt 
that centralized schools have better teachers, facilities and curriculum offerings (Zhuo, 
2006). However, there are documented costs as well. Shi (2004) has shown that when 
boarding schools are poorly managed, children perform worse in school. Some studies 
have found that the poor nutrition and health in boarding schools (relative to the home 
environment) are correlated with poor educational performance (Luo et al., 2009; Luo et 
al., 2010). Shi et al. (2009) has evidence that students who transfer from their own 
village’s teaching points into boarding facilities in a centrally located township schools 
have more behavioral and psychological problems. To date, only one research team (to 
our knowledge) has attempted to empirically disaggregate the costs and benefits to 
determine the net effect of the Merger Program on students. Using data from a large 
sample in Shaanxi province, Liu et al. (2010) find that the overall effect of transferring 
students from a village school or teaching point closed under the Merger Program to a 
larger, more central school is neutral; that is, the benefits from the improved resource 
effect are similar in magnitude to the costs. The question of whether and how different 
transfer paths lead to better academic performance has not yet been quantitatively 
analyzed.   
The key questions we attempt to address in our study include: What transfer paths 
are students taking as a result of the Merger Program and other educational policy shifts? 
How are student test scores affected by the nature of the transfer path? Does the Merger 
Program lead to improved academic performance? Are there any negative impacts of the 5 
 
Merger Program? How are these related to the different transfer paths or whether students 
are boarded? 
In order to answer the above questions, we first outline the transfer paths that 
students have taken and the distribution of these transfer paths in our sample. We then 
compare standardized math test scores of students who took different paths. We also 
identify characteristics of the educational experiences of students that were (may have 
been) affected by the Merger Program and examine their impact on students that took 
different transfer paths. From this analysis, we make general assessments of the academic 
costs and benefits that the Merger Policy imposes on students.   
In the next section, we describe the data collection process and features of the 
dataset. In Section 3 we conduct a descriptive analysis of transfer paths and student 
academic performance. The econometric model is specified in Section 4 and the results 
are discussed in Section 5. In the last section we conclude. 
 
2. Data 
       The dataset we use is generated from a survey carried out by the Chinese Academy 
of Sciences and Xibei University of Xian in September, 2009 in a poor county in Shanxi 
Province. The county, located on the Yellow River in northwest Shanxi province, is an 
appropriate place to study the impact of transfer paths on the educational performance of 
students in poor areas for several reasons. The active Merger Program and other policy 
changes allowing for various transfer options make our study county a place where transfer 6 
 
paths have changed significantly over the past several years. The county is one of the 
poorest county in Shanxi Province and one of the poorest in the nation, making it 
representative of poor areas in China. In 2008 the average yearly income of farmers in the 
county was 1024 Yuan (150 USD at nominal exchange rates). In 2008 less than 10 percent 
of China’s population earned under 0.57 USD per day. The county also has many features 
common to other regions in Northwestern China, a region of the country defined based on 
geographical and cultural characteristics (Han, Regional Geography of China, 2000). It is 
located in the mountainous region of the Loess Plateau. Although there are natural 
resources (e.g., coal—which by policy belongs to the State), it has scarce agricultural 
resources due to climate, soils and access to markets.  
Our sample consists of the entire seventh grade (first year of junior high school) 
population in the county in 2009. The entire primary school experience of these students 
took place during the implementation of the Merger Program, which started in 2001 and 
accelerated afterwards. All ten junior high schools in the county were visited. A total of 
1507 students participated in the survey, with the participation rate exceeding 99 percent. 
The students that were surveyed have characteristics that are typical of rural seventh 
graders in China. There are around 6 percent more boys than girls, a similar ratio to that 
cited in the Ministry of Education’s 2006 Annual Yearbook. Approximately 95 percent of 
the students are aged between 11 and 14 years of age. Around 23 percent of the students 
had been held back one or more grades during primary school (see Chen et al., 2009, for a 
complete discussion on retention).   7 
 
  The survey instrument included three main blocks. The first block focused on the 
schooling histories of students. We asked students a series of questions about their time in 
their elementary schools as a way to re-create each student’s transfer path from grade 1 to 
grade 6. Specific questions included primary schools ever attended, which grades were 
spent in each school, school location, reasons for each transfer and boarding status. We 
produce from these questions several variables: student transfer path; boarding status; and 
a number of controls for pre-primary educational experience. 
The second section was a 30 minute standardized math test. This test is used as a 
measure of each student’s educational performance. Using tests on basic skills, such as 
math, to serve as a measurement of academic performance is a common practice in the 
literature (Reynolds, 1991; Glewwe et al., 1995; Tan et al., 1997; Gruman et al., 2008 etc.). 
Because we administered the survey/test ourselves, we know that there was no coaching for 
the test before our survey. Since the test is administered at the start of the school year, we 
also know that neither students nor teachers shifted their efforts from other subjects to math. 
The test was scored on a scale from 0 to 100. The results we obtained closely approximate a 
normal distribution with a mean score of 56 points and a standard deviation of 17 points. 
We keep the scores without any further manipulation for the ease of interpretation. 
The third and final section of the survey contained a number of questions on each 
student's personal and family characteristics. These questions gathered data on each 
student’s age, gender, household registration (hukou) and ethnicity. Information on the 
socio-economic background of students was also obtained through questions about the 8 
 
number of members in each student’s family and each family member’s hukou status, age, 
employment status and schooling history. The answers to detailed questions about 
household assets were used to generate a variable measuring the value of the household 
durable assets to represent household socioeconomic status or wealth. All of the control 
variables in our econometric model are produced from the above information. 
 
3. Transfer paths and academic performance 
In part because of the closing and/or merging of a large number of schools, nearly 
half (49 percent) of our sample transferred from one school to another at some point 
during their primary school years. Our data contain many unique starting and ending 
points for the transfer experiences of students which we use to identify a variety of 
student transfer paths. In this section, we describe these transfer paths, identify the most 
common paths and link them (descriptively) with academic performance. 
Student transfer paths 
  In examining the starting school (first school attended between grades 1 and 6) 
and ending school (last school attended between grades 1 and 6) of each student’s primary 
school experience, a number of student transfer path patterns emerge (Table 1). Our data 
show that more students transfer to town and county schools than transfer from them. 
Likewise, more students transfer from teaching points and village schools than transfer to 
them. Indeed, no students in our sample transferred to a teaching point. This pattern 
suggests that the activities in our sample counties are consistent with the goals of the 9 
 
Merger Program; that is, students are being encouraged to transfer from teaching points or 
village schools to more centralized town and county schools.   
Our analysis focuses on the student transfer paths of students who started primary 
school in teaching points or village schools and transferred to more centralized schools, as 
these students are the target population of the Merger Program and account for about 71 
percent of all transfer experiences. These specific student transfer paths also form one of 
the bases for our analysis. 
Of students who started school in teaching points (25 percent of all students), the 
length of stay in the teaching point varies but does not exceed four years (Table 2). This is 
because teaching points, despite being an important component of the traditional rural 
primary education system, usually do not provide education beyond the fourth grade. Our 
data reflect this fact: no students in our sample complete their primary education at a 
teaching point and no students remain enrolled at a teaching point beyond the fourth grade 
(although students can theoretically spend more than four years at a teaching point if they 
fail to matriculate to the next grade after one academic year).   
The ending schools vary for students with identical starting points. The majority 
of students who started in teaching points eventually transferred to town schools (Table 
3—around 56 percent). Another 30 percent transferred to county schools. Most of the 
students who started in village schools also transferred to a more centralized school, either 
town or county schools. Only a small share of students transferred to village schools. 
Only 13 percent of students who started in teaching points and 14 percent of students who 10 
 
started in village schools transferred to a (another) village school. This movement away 
from village schools is likely (at least in a significant part) because of the closing of 
village schools under the Merger Program. 
Academic performance 
  Our data show that mean math scores are correlated with different student transfer 
paths, with the direction of correlation seemingly determined by the resource effect (Table 
3). All scores over 60 are associated with either starting or ending education in county 
schools. Moreover, when the starting points are held constant, test scores decrease with 
the level of centralization of the ending points. In other words, students who have 
attended county schools (as their ending schools) have the highest scores; students who 
have attended town schools achieve the second highest scores; and students who have 
attended village schools have the lowest scores.   
Using kernel density plots (Figures 1 and 2), we can provide distributional 
evidence on the impact of transfer paths on math scores beyond the mean comparisons. 
Figure 1 includes the plots using information from the group of students that started in 
teaching points; Figure 2 includes plots using information from the group of students that 
started in village schools. The figures show that the mean difference is caused not by a 
small group of extremely high-achieving students but by overall improvements in scores 
(across the distribution). Figure 2 shows that the mean scores increase and the distribution 
better approximates a normal distribution as the students ending school change from 
village schools to town schools to county schools. Overall, then, our data indicate that 11 
 
students perform better academically when they transfer from less-centralized schools to 
more-centralized schools, and that their performance increases most when they transfer to 
county schools. This trend is true of all students, regardless of where they started 
schooling.
1   
Boarding status also can be shown to be correlated with math scores (Table 4). 
According to our data, non-boarding students have higher mean math scores than do 
boarding students. The difference between boarding and non-boarding student reaches 10 
points (or about 0.6 standard deviations) and is significant at the 1% level. This trend 
holds true for mean math scores within each student transfer path. In fact, boarding 
students, on average, never score higher than non-boarding students.  
Other student characteristics 
Other characteristics—beyond their transfer paths and boarding school status—also 
may affect academic performance. According to the literature (Shariff, 1998; Gibson, 
2001; Borooah, 2005; Linnemayr, Alderman, & Ka, 2008; Chen & Li, 2009, Liu et al 
2010 etc.) individual student characteristics, such as gender, age, hukou identity, 
kindergarten and preschool attendance and the number of elder siblings may affect 
educational performance. Parental characteristics (age, education and occupation) and 
household characteristics (e.g., household size and wealth) also have been shown to affect 
academic performance.   
                                                      
1 One exception to the ending school trend: students who started in a county school earned average test 
scores of 61 or 62 regardless of where they ended. 12 
 
Descriptive statistics show that some of these variables seem to be associated with 
student test scores in our sample (Table 5). For example, students with higher scores seem 
to be younger, have kindergarten experience, have no elder siblings, have better educated 
parents with off-farm jobs and come from non-rural and richer households. These findings 
underline the importance of conducting multivariate analysis and including parental and 
household characteristics in the analysis as control variables since they may also be 
correlated with student transfer paths.  
 
4. Multivariate model 
  The data and descriptive analysis presented in the previous section show substantial 
differences in math scores across student transfer paths. However, based on a simple 
comparison of means it is impossible to satisfactorily attribute the differences in scores to 
the different student transfer paths. In this section we present an econometric analysis to 
address this issue. We first present different estimators and specifications and we then 
discuss how we intend to perform robustness and sensitivity checks. The results are 
presented in Section 5.   
 
4.1 Basic estimator—Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
In estimating the impact of student transfer paths and boarding status on math test 
scores, we first use OLS—controlling (at least in part) for selection bias (and endogeneity 13 
 
due to unobserved heterogeneity) by including a large set of observable covariates in the 
regression of key independent variables on math scores: 
i i i i i X B P y                                      (1) 
where, the dependent variable yi indicates the math score of student i; Pi is a vector that 
includes six student transfer paths of interest: a.) from teaching points to village schools; 
b.) from teaching points to town schools; c.) from teaching points to county schools; d.) 
from village schools to other village schools; e.) from village schools to town schools and 
f.) from village schools to county schools. The symbol, Bi , is the our boarding status 
indicator variable, which takes a value of 1 if the student has ever boarded during the 
years that he/she was in elementary school and 0 if the student has never boarded. Finally, 
the term Xi is a vector of covariates (or other control variables) that is included to capture 
the effect on the dependent variable of the characteristics of students, parents and 
households. To increase efficiency, we compute White’s heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors in all regressions.   
 
4.2 Alternative estimator—Propensity score matching (PSM) 
Rather than directly correcting for a large number of relevant covariates, 
adjustments can be made based on a propensity score—defined as the conditional 
probability of receiving ―treatment‖ (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983, Imbens, 2004; Dehejia 
and Wahba, 2002, Liu et al., 2010). In our setup, the treatments are defined to be the 
different student transfer paths and boarding statuses. Specifically, we compare (the 14 
 
characteristics of) students who attended teaching points with those who did not; those who 
transferred from village schools to town schools with those who stayed in village schools; 
those who transferred from village schools to county schools with those who stayed in 
village schools; and those who boarded (or boarding status=1) with those did not. We are 
ultimately interested in estimating the average treatment effects on the treated (ATT) of 
attending teaching points, transferring from village schools to town schools, transferring 
from village schools to county schools, and boarding status on academic performance. The 
propensity score (i.e. the conditional probability of ―receiving‖ these treatments) is 
calculated by estimating a logit model with student, parental and household characteristics 
as the independent variables (Appendix 1). 
We estimate the ATTs with a propensity score matching (PSM) method where 
matching involves pairing treatment and comparison units with similar propensity scores 
(Abadie and Imbens, 2002). In other words, ATTs are calculated as a weighted average of 
the outcome difference between treated and matched controls. PSM is a more general 
method than standard linear regression since it does not require assumptions about 
linearity or constant treatment effects, and thus improves bias correction. Moreover, 
imposing common support in PSM can lead to efficiency improvements, especially when 
the sample size is small. It should be noted, however, that PSM estimates are only 
unbiased if the unobservables are correlated with the obsevables upon which the matching 
is based. 15 
 
In our paper we use several different matching algorithms. Specifically, we first 
use Nearest Neighbor Matching where matching is done with replacements in order to 
ensure that each treatment unit is matched to the comparison unit nearest to it in 
propensity score (which is one way to maximize the reduction of selection bias—Imbens, 
2004):   
     
C j
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                        (2) 
where, 
T
i y indicates the math score of student i in the treatment group (T) and 
C
j y is the 
―nearest neighbor‖ j in the control group (C) that is matched to i; N
T and N
C denotes the 
number of treated units and that of control units respectively.  
  To serve as robustness checks, we also use Kernel Matching and Stratification 
Matching, because they incorporate trade-offs between quality and quantity of matches 
differently than the Nearest Neighbor Matching (Becker & Ichino, 2002). Kernel Matching 
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where every treated unit i is matched with a weighted average of all control units j with 
weights that are inversely proportional to the distance between their scores pj - pi; G() is a 
kernel function with hn the bandwidth parameter.  
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where, observations are divided by blocks Q defined over intervals of the propensity score; 
in each block q treated unites and control unites have balanced covariates; ATT in each 








i D ) ( .These methods are all implemented with common support, a logit model for 
calculating the propensity score, and bootstrapped standard errors. The joint consideration 
of the three methods offers a way to assess the robustness of the estimates. 
 
4.3 Sensitivity analysis 
The applied regression (OLS) and matching methods can yield unbiased estimates 
of ATT subject to the crucial assumption of conditional independence (CIA): conditional 
upon observable covariates, the receipt of treatment is independent of the potential 
outcomes with and without treatment (Imbens, 2004). This assumption is not directly 
testable with non-experimental data (Imbens, 2004), but Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini 
(2006) proposed a method for testing the sensitivity of matching estimates against the 
assumption. The method simulates an unobserved binary confounder that is suspected to 
affect both academic performance and transfer paths/boarding status. We use the method 
with confounders calibrated to mimic observable binary covariates as in Ichino et al. 
(2006). We will discuss the simulated confounders and results in the next section.   
 
5. Results and discussion 17 
 
The estimation results of the basic estimator using equation (1) are presented in 
Table 6. Column (1) to (3) of Table 6 differ in the independent variables that are included 
in estimation: column (1) only includes the student transfer path variables (with no 
covariates); in column (2) we add the boarding status variable; and in column (3) we 
include the boarding status variable and all of the covariates. The model performs better 
as we move from column (1) to column (3) as the R-square grows and covariates are 
shown to effectively capture more of the variation in math scores. Therefore, in the rest of 
our discussion we mostly focus on the results in column (3). 
The results in Table 6 can be seen to be largely consistent with the descriptive 
analysis. There are three main results (based on column (3)). First, holding other factors, 
students who started primary school in teaching points or village schools in general have 
lower math scores if they transferred to village or town schools and did not transfer to 
county schools. The negative effect of transferring from a teaching point to a village or 
town school is 6.8 and 7.3 points respectively (row 1 & 2).
  2  The negative effect of 
transferring from a village school to another village school is 9.7 points (row 4). Keeping 
the starting point constant, students who transferred to county school have significant and 
larger positive transfer effects. Transferring from a teaching point to a county school has a 
positive effect of 4.3 points (row 3) and transferring from a village school to a county 
school has a positive effect of 8.0 points (row 6). These effects seem to add up to a 
                                                      
2  The coefficients on the dummy variables which measure some of the common transfer paths of students 
in the sample are compared with the base (excluded) group. In this table, the base group is all students 
that started elementary school in either a town or county school and the students who did not transfer. 18 
 
difference of 11.1 points for teaching point starters who ended in village school compared 
to those that ended up in a county school (row 1 & 3). The difference is 17.7 points for 
those that started school in a village school and ended in village school compared to those 
that started in a village school and ended in a county school (row 4 & 6).   
Second, our results also show that boarding status matters. In particular, holding 
all other factors constant (including the student transfer path), when a student stays in a 
boarding facility there is a significant negative effect (at 1% level) on his/her math scores. 
The results show that the boarding student’s score is reduced by 3.7 points (row 7).   
Third, many of the covariates are shown to affect academic performance as 
expected. For example, the older students perform worse than younger students 
(significant at 1% level, row 9); rural hukou has a negative effect (significant at 5% level, 
row 10); attending kindergarten helps increase math score (at 1% level, row11); having 
elder sibling reduces math score (at 1% level, row 13); students that have mother working 
in agriculture score lower (at 1% level, row 19). 
Propensity Score Matching   
The results of the PSM analysis are shown to be qualitatively identical and 
quantitatively similar with the OLS results and that the results are similar across the sets 
of results generated by the three alternative PSM estimation strategies (Table 7). Rows 1 
to 3 present the ATTs estimated using Nearest Neighbor Matching, Kernel Matching and 
Stratification Matching, respectively. Column 1 shows that teaching points has a negative 
effect on the math scores of students and the effect is 3.6 points which is significant at 1% 19 
 
level in Kernel and Stratification Matching (Row 2 & 3). Column 2 shows that for 
students who started primary education in a village school and then transferred to town 
school improves his/her scores by 7.6-9.0 points when compared to the students that 
stayed in their own village schools (Row 3 and 2). Column 3 also shows that village 
school starters who transferred to county schools can make progress as large as 19.0 to 
20.5 points (Row 1-3). Column 4 shows that boarding status has a negative effect of 
5.8-6.4 points (Row 1-3), which is slightly larger than the OLS estimates. In general, 
estimates of Kernel Matching and Stratification Matching have lower standard errors, 
which is likely due to a larger number of control units that these methods take into 
account. 
Assessing the Assumption of Conditional Independence (CIA) 
Despite the preceding analysis, the transfer paths are so diverse that it could be 
that even though we control for a large number of observable variables, there could be 
other unobservables that may have simultaneously affected the transfer paths and 
academic results of students (violating the assumption of conditional independence of 
treatment). Following Ichino et al. (2006), we assess the validity of the conditional 
independence assumption by simulating an unobserved confounder that is used as 
additional matching factor.   
We calibrate the confounder to mimic mother’s education level and students’ plan 
to go to high school (Appendix 1) to simulate students’ capability and taste for schooling. 
We show in Table 8 that the estimators with binary confounder differ less than 5% from 20 
 
the previous PSM results in Table 7.
3  This is an indication of the robustness of the ATT 
estimates and validity of the CIA assumption as far as we can test.   
 
7. Discussion and Conclusions 
In this paper we have tried to understand how the Merger Program may have 
affected the academic performance of students by analyzing a set of transfer paths that 
students have taken during primary education. Despite the controversies about the benefits 
and costs of the Merger Program, our results show that at least in our study county, there 
is positive resource effect that is gain when students transfer from less centralized schools 
(such as teaching points or village schools) to more centralized schools (such as town 
schools and county schools). This positive effect, however, may be partially offset by 
boarding. When students stay in boarding schools, there is a large measured negative 
effect. Hence, if a student transfers from a village school (or teaching point) to a town (or 
county) school, but has to stay in the school’s boarding facilities, the positive resource 
effect may, at least in part, be reduced by the negative boarding school effect. However, 
by comparing the transfer effect with the boarding effect, we find that even if students 
board after transfer, they still benefit academically from transferring to county school no 
matter whether they started primary education in teaching point or village school. 
                                                      
3 By including the additional confounder, the effect of transferring from village to town school is shown to be 
significant (Table 8). Without the confounder it is not significant (Table 7, Column 2, Row 1). However, the 
estimates in Table 8 are very similar with the ones using the other two PSM methods (Table 7, Column 2, Row 
2 & 3). 21 
 
Policywise, our paper has several implications. First, the results confirm that the 
additional resources that the government was hoping would come to bear by the Merger 
Program appears to be true. In other words, the results are a vindication of the decision to 
shut down local elementary schools and create centralized schools at the town and county 
level. The results, however, give extra impetus to the finding of Shi et al. (2009) and his 
findings that the nation should put extra emphasis on managing boarding schools. If a way 
could be made to attenuate the negative boarding school effect, students might be able to 
take more advantage of the additional resources—teaching and facilities—that are being 
made available by the Merger Program.   22 
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Table 1. Distribution of sample students starting in and graduating from different 
types of primary schools (Shilou County, Shanxi Province, China 2009) 
Type of school 
Starting school  Ending school 
No.  %  No.  % 
County school  649  43.1  873  57.9 
Town school  237  15.7  465  30.9 
Village school  248  16.5  169  11.2 
Teaching point  373  24.8  0  0 
Total  1507  100  1507  100 25 
 
Table 2. Number of years that sample students spent in teaching points and mean 
score (Shilou County, Shanxi Province, China 2009) 
Years of schooling spent 
in teaching point 
Obs. 
No.  % 
0  1118  74.2  
1  38  2.5  
2  60  4.0  
3  134  8.9  
4  157  10.4  
Total  1507  100 26 
 
Table 3. The distribution and mean math scores of sample 




No.  %  score 
1  Teaching point-village school  50  3.3  45.3 
2  Teaching point-town school  210  13.9  46.7 
3  Teaching point-county school  113  7.5  60 
4  Village-village school  14  0.9  46.4 
5  Village-town school  41  2.7  55.3 
6  Village-county school  100  6.6  64.1 
7  Town-village school  5  0.3  50 
8  Town-town school  44  2.9  55.1 
9  Town-county school  39  2.6  68.2 
10  County-village school  22  1.5  61.6 
11  County-town school  6  0.4  61.7 
12  County-county school  97  6.4  60.6 
13  No transfer  766  50.8  57.5 




Table 4. The distribution and mean math scores of sample students by 
boarding status (Shilou County, Shanxi Province, China 2009) 
Transfer paths 
Boarding  Non-boarding 
No.  %  Score  No.  %  Score 
1.  Teaching point-village school  29  58  45.3  21  42  45.2 
2.  Teaching point-town school  105  50  46.9  105  50  46.6 
3.  Teaching point-county school  19  16.8  58.4  94  83.2  60.1 
4.  Village-village school  3  21.4  40  11  78.6  48.2 
5.  Village-town school  12  29.3  48.8  28  70.7  58 
6.  Village-county school  18  18  58.1  82  82  65.4 
7.  Town-village school  2  40  40  3  60  56.7 
8.  Town-town school  5  9.1  53  40  90.9  55.4 
9.  Town-county school  12  30.8  62.9  27  69.2  70.6 
10.  County-village school  1  4.5  50  21  95.5  62.1 
11.  County-town school  0  0                      6  100  61.7 
12.  County-county school  16  16.5  56.6  81  83.5  61.4 
13.  No transfer  62  8.1  46.8  704  91.9  58.5 





Table 5. Decomposed student characteristics and mean math scores 
(Shilou County, Shanxi Province, China 2009) 
Variables   Value range  Mean math scores  Std. Dev 
Student characteristics 
Gender  female  57.3   17.5  
  male  55.8   17.2  
Age, year  [9,12]  59.0   17.7  
  (12,13]  55.5   17.1  
  (13,16]  54.3   16.9  
Rural hukou identity  no  63.7   16.3  
  yes  54.9   17.2  
Attended kindergarten  no  52.9   16.4  
  yes  57.3   17.5  
Attended preschool  no  56.2   17.8  
  yes  57.1   16.4  
Have elder sibling  no  59.5   17.3  
  yes  54.7   17.2  
Parental characteristics       
Age of father  [30,38]  56.4   17.3  
  (38,41]  58.2   17.5  
  (41,62]  54.6   17.2  
Age of mother  [28,36]  57.1   17.0  
  (36,39]  57.2   18.2  
  (39,55]  54.9   16.8  
Father holding middle school diploma  no  54.3   17.3  
  yes  58.9   17.1  
Mother holding middle school diploma  no  54.5   17.3  
  yes  59.6   17.1  
Father working in agriculture  no  58.4   17.5  
  yes  52.6   16.4  
Mother working in agriculture  no  60.2   17.4  
  yes  52.0   16.3  
Household characteristics       
Household size  [1,4]  59.6   17.5  
  (4,5]  54.2   17.0  
  (5,9]  54.9   16.9  
Household durable assets value (1000 yuan)  [0,6.5]  55.1   17.8  
  (6.5,12]  56.3   17.2  
  (12,218]  58.0   17.0  29 
 
Table 6. Multivariate regression results analyzing transfer paths and their 
impact on students' academic achievement (Shilou County, Shanxi 
Province, China 2009) 
Dependent variable: standardized math score (0-100 pts) 
    (1)  (2)  (3) 
Path variables and boarding status      1. Transfer from teaching point to village school, 1= yes  -12.9***  -10.5***  -6.8*** 
  [-6.5]  [-5.0]  [-3.1] 
2. Transfer from teaching point to town school, 1= yes  -11.5***  -9.5***  -7.3*** 
  [-10.3]  [-7.6]  [-5.6] 
        3. Transfer from teaching point to county school, 1= yes  1.6  1.9  4.3** 
  [0.9]  [1.1]  [2.4] 
        4. Transfer from village school to village school, 1= yes  -11.8**  -11.2**  -9.7* 
  [-2.4]  [-2.3]  [-2.0] 
        5. Transfer from village school to town school, 1=yes  -3.0  -2.0  0.9 
  [-1.1]  [-0.7]  [0.3] 
        6. Transfer from village school to county school, 1= yes  5.9***  6.2***  8.0*** 
  [3.6]  [3.9]  [4.7] 
        7. Boarding status, 1=boarded  -5.0***  -3.7*** 
    [-4.2]  [-3.2] 
Student characteristics      8. Male=1,female=0    -1.0 
      [-1.2] 
        9. Age, year      -1.3*** 
      [-2.7] 
        10. Hukou identity, 1=rural    -3.2** 
      [-2.4] 
        11. Kindergarten, 1=attended    3.7*** 
      [3.4] 
        12. Preschool, 1=attended    0.4 
      [0.5] 
        13. Having elder sibling, 1=yes    -3.5*** 
      [-3.5] 
Parental characteristics      14. Age of father, year    0.0 
      [0.0] 
        15. Age of mother, year    0.1 
      [0.2] 
        16. Father holding middle school diploma, 1=yes  0.7 
      [0.7] 
        17. Mother holding middle school diploma, 1=yes  0.6 
      [0.6] 
        18. Father working in agriculture, 1=yes    -0.1 
      [-0.1] 
        19. Mother working in agriculture, 1=yes    -3.2*** 
      [-2.9] 
Household characteristics      20. Household size    -0.1 
      [-0.2] 
21. Household durable assets value (1000 yuan)  0.0 
      [0.4] 
        Constant  58.2***  58.7***  76.2*** 
  [105.2]  [105.6]  [10.0] 
        Observations  1507  1507  1507 
R-squared  0.08  0.09  0.15 
 
Note: 1) t statistics in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
2) The coefficients on the dummy variables which measure some of the common transfer paths of 
students in the sample are compared with the base (excluded) group. In this table, the base group is 
all students that started elementary school in either a town or county school and the students who did 
not transfer.30 
 
Table 7. PSM results analyzing transfer paths and their impact on students' 
academic achievement (Shilou County, Shanxi Province, China 2009) 
    Average treatment effect of the treated (ATT) 

















1. Nearest Neighbor 
Matching  -2.4  5.2  20.5***  -5.8*** 
  [1.9]  [11.8]  [5.6]  [1.8] 
2. Kernel Matching  -3.6***  9.0***  19.0***  -6.4*** 
  [1.2]  [3.1]  [2.3]  [1.1] 
3. Stratification Matching  -3.6***  7.6***  19.2***  -6.4*** 
    [1.2]  [3.1]  [2.6]  [1.1] 
Note: bootstrapped standard errors in brackets; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** 
significant at 1%. 31 
 
Table  8.  Simulation-based  sensitivity  analysis  for  propensity  score  matching 
estimators
1 










Treatment (1): Attending teaching points       
A. Confounder calibrated to mimic mother's education level   -2.4  1.5  0.3 
B. Confounder calibrated to mimic student’s plan for high school    -2.8  2.8  0.9 
Treatment (2): Transfer from village school to town school       
A. Confounder calibrated to mimic mother's education level  8.9*  0.8  0.9 
B. Confounder calibrated to mimic student’s plan for high school  9.0**  4.1  1.1 
Treatment (3): Transfer from village school to county school     
A. Confounder calibrated to mimic mother's education level  18.9***  0.9  1.8 
B. Confounder calibrated to mimic student’s plan for high school  18.4***  4.5  3.5 
Treatment (4): Boarding       
A. Confounder calibrated to mimic mother's education level  -6.3***  1.4  0.4 
B. Confounder calibrated to mimic student’s plan for high school   -5.9***  2.7  0.7 
 
Note: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
1 The method is described by Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2006) and builds on Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) and 
Rosenbaum (1987). The method simulates this binary confounder in the data that is used as an additional matching 
factor. A comparison of the estimates obtained with and without matching on the simulated confounder informs to 
what extent the estimator is robust to this specific source of failure of the conditional independence assumption. 
2 The outcome effect measures the estimated effect of the simulated binary confounder on the outcome 
variable—math score. 
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Appendix 1 Summary of mean characteristics of students (Shilou County, Shanxi 
Province, China 2009) 
Variables  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Transfer paths and boarding dummies   
Teaching point-village school  0.0  0.2  0  1 
Teaching point-town school  0.1  0.3  0  1 
Teaching point-county school  0.1  0.3  0  1 
Village-village school  0.0  0.1  0  1 
Village-town school  0.0  0.2  0  1 
Village-county school  0.1  0.2  0  1 
Stay in village school  0.1  0.2  0  1 
Boarding status, 1=yes  0.2  0.4  0  1 
         
Student characteristics     
Male, 1=yes  0.5  0.5  0  1 
Age, year  12.9  0.9  9  16 
Hukou identity, 1=rural  0.8  0.4  0  1 
Kindergarten, 1=yes  0.8  0.4  0  1 
Preschool, 1=yes  0.3  0.5  0  1 
Having elder sibling, 1=yes  0.6  0.5  0  1 
   
Parental characteristics   
Age of father, year  39.6  4.3  30  62 
Age of mother, year  37.9  4.1  28  55 
Father holding middle school diploma, 1=yes  0.5  0.5  0  1 
Mother holding middle school diploma, 1=yes  0.4  0.5  0  1 
Father working in agriculture, 1=yes  0.3  0.5  0  1 
Mother working in agriculture, 1=yes  0.5  0.5  0  1 
         
Household characteristics          
Household size  4.9  1.0  1  9 
Household wealth  1.0  0.2  0  1 
         
Coundoufer for simulation for sensitivity analysis         
Mother holding middle school diploma, 1=yes  0.4  0.5  0  1 
Student’s plan for high school, 1=go to high school 
after graduation  0.7  0.4  0  1 
 